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THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN THE TREATMENT OF
JUVENILE DELINQUENTS
George Bundy Smith*
Gloria M Dabiri**
INTRODUCTION
For decades, a debate has occurred among scholars and
professionals concerning how to deal with juveniles who have
committed acts which would be criminal if they were adults. Some
have argued that the state has a special interest in seeing that its
youth grow to be productive adults. This view has resulted in a
special status for youngsters and special juvenile courts when
youngsters get into trouble. Others have argued that the reality of
crime committed by juveniles is of such a nature that there is no
longer any need for juvenile courts.
Prior to the passage of the Juvenile Offender Legislation which
took effect on September 1, 1978,1 the minimum age at which one
could enter the adult criminal justice system in New York State
was sixteen.2 Persons under sixteen years of age were charged and
tried for being juvenile delinquents, and their cases were
Associate Judge, Court of Appeals of the State of New York. Judge Smith
has been a judge for 20 years, serving in the Civil and Criminal Courts of the
City of New York, the Family Court of the State of New York, as well as the
Supreme Court and Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New
York.
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adjudicated in the family court Since the passage of that legisla-
tion, a youth who is thirteen years of age and accused of murder in
the second degree is tried not in the family court, but in the adult
criminal justice system in a supreme or county court.' Similarly,
a youth who is fourteen or fifteen years of age and accused of
murder in the second degree, or a number of other serious crimes,
is charged and tried in the adult criminal court.' Since the passage
of the Juvenile Offender Legislation in New York and similar
legislation in other states, the argument that juvenile courts are no
longer needed has grown louder.
This Article reviews the debate among those who have argued
and still argue for special clinical and rehabilitative treatment for
youngsters accused of crime and those who argue that youngsters,
for the most part, must be treated as adults. Part I reexamines some
of the key cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court which
challenged the procedures in the courts established for the treatment
of juveniles; part II discusses the reasons for today's trend toward
3 Id.
' New York's Criminal Procedure Law defines a juvenile offender as:
(1) a person, thirteen years old who is criminally responsible for acts
constituting murder in the second degree as defined in subdivisions one
and two of section 125.25 of the penal law and (2) a person fourteen
or fifteen years old who is criminally responsible for acts constituting
the crimes defined in subdivisions one and two of section 125.25
(murder in the second degree) and in subdivision three of such section
provided that the underlying crime for the murder charge is one for
which such person is criminally responsible; section 135.25 (kidnap-
ping in the first degree); 150.20 (arson in the first degree); subdivisions
one and two of section 120.10 (assault in the first degree); 125.20
(manslaughter in the first degree); subdivisions one and two of section
130.35 (rape in the first degree); subdivisions one and two of section
130.50 (sodomy in the first degree); 130.70 (aggravated sexual abuse);
140.30 (burglary in the first degree); subdivision one of section 140.25
(burglary in the second degree); 150.15 (arson in the second degree);
160.15 (robbery in the first degree) or subdivision two of section
160.10 (robbery in the second degree) of the penal law; or defined in
the penal law as an attempt to commit murder in the second degree or
kidnapping in the first degree.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20(42) (McKinney 1992).
5 Id.
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harsher treatment of juveniles; part III looks at some of the
innovative methods for addressing juvenile delinquency; and part
IV assesses the role of the judge in this debate. In conclusion, this
Article shows that the debate has been and is a continuing one,
with a number of consequences for Americans, whoever prevails.
This Article does not address whether juvenile and family
courts should be preserved, or whether such courts should continue
to retain jurisdiction over young offenders.6 Rather, this Article
posits that judges who preside over matters in which children are
directly or indirectly involved must be sensitive to the developmen-
tal needs and possible risks that these children face and, within the
bounds of their judicial authority, must be pro-activist in the effort
to prevent youth crimes and violence.
I. KEY CASES IN THE TREATMENT OF PERSONS ACCUSED OF
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
The modern watershed case on the treatment of juveniles
accused of crime is In re Gault,' decided in 1967 by the U.S.
Supreme Court. In holding that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that certain procedural safeguards
be given to juveniles charged with criminal activity, the Supreme
Court discussed the issue of the clinical and rehabilitative approach
to dealing with juveniles as opposed to treating them like adults.
The Court concluded that the Due Process Clause requires proper
notice of charges, the right to be represented by an attorney, the
right against self-incrimination and the right of confrontation of
6 For a discussion of the arguments in favor of and in opposition to the
abolition of family and juvenile courts, see Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining
Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the
Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1083 (1991); Michael J. Dale, The Supreme
Court and the Minimization of Children's Constitutional Rights: Implications for
the Juvenile Justice System, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 199 (1992);
Katherine Hunt Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the
Preservation of Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23 (1990); Irene
Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile
Court Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 163 (1993).
7 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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witnesses! All of these rights are guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution and most had been previously made applicable to the
states by decisions of the Supreme Court.9
The Gault case revealed a number of practices which called into
question the fairness of juvenile proceedings in Arizona. At the
time of his arrest, Gerald Gault was fifteen years of age and was
on probation for his involvement in the stealing of a wallet from a
woman's purse.' On June 8, 1964, Gault and a friend were
arrested for allegedly making an obscene phone call to a woman."
The Gault opinion contains the following description of the
proceedings in the judge's chambers on June 9 and 15, 1964:
On June 9, Gerald, his mother, his older brother, and
Probation Officers Flagg and Henderson appeared before
the Juvenile Judge in chambers. Gerald's father was not
there. He was at work out of the city. Mrs. Cook, the
complainant, was not there. No one was sworn at this
hearing. No transcript or recording was made. No memo-
randum or record of the substance of the proceedings was
prepared. Our information about the proceedings and the
subsequent hearing on June 15, derives entirely from the
testimony of the Juvenile Court Judge, . . . Mr. and Mrs.
Gault and Officer Flagg at the habeas corpus proceeding
conducted two months later. 12
Without any formal notice of the charges against him, without the
testimony of the complainant, and after the judge had himself
questioned the juvenile, Gerald was found to be a delinquent child;
the judge committed him to the State Industrial School for the
8 Id. at 33-50.
9 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel in cases
where defendant could receive sentence of imprisonment made applicable to
states); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 1 (1965) (right to confront witnesses made
applicable to states); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (right against self-
incrimination made applicable to states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (right to counsel ensured to indigent defendants in state prosecutions).
10 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4.
"1 Id.
12 Id. at 5-6.
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period of his minority, that is, until he reached the age of twenty-
one years unless discharged earlier by due process of law.13 An
adult violating the applicable Arizona statute 4 could have been
fined five dollars to fifty dollars or been imprisoned for no more
than two months. 5
No appeal of the sentence by the juvenile court judge was then
possible under Arizona law.16 Gault brought a habeas corpus
proceeding in the Supreme Court of Arizona, which referred the
matter to the superior court. The superior court dismissed the writ
and the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed. 7 Gault appealed to
the Supreme Court of the United States.
In the Gault decision, Justice Abe Fortas dwelt at length on the
reasons behind the whole juvenile court movement, which had
spread from Illinois in 1899 to every state in the Union, the District
of Columbia and Puerto Rico.' 8 Briefly stated, the advocates of
the juvenile court movement saw as detrimental the treatment of
juveniles who were accused of criminal activity as adults. Their
objective was to treat juveniles clinically, with the primary purpose
being punishment rather than rehabilitation. Justice Fortas stated:
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and
penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long
prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened crimi-
nals. They were profoundly convinced that society's duty
to the child could not be confined by the concept of justice
alone. They believed that society's role was not to ascer-
tain whether the child was "guilty" or "innocent," but
"What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had
best-be done in his interest and in the interest of the state
to save him from a downward career." The
'3 Id. at 7-8.
4 Under Arizona law, it is a misdemeanor when a person "in the presence
or hearing of any woman or child ... uses vulgar, abusive or obscene language
. " AARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-377 (1989) (current version at ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-2904 (1994)).
11 Gault, 387 U.S. at 9.
16 In re Gault, 407 P.2d 760, 764 (Ariz. 1965).
17 id.
IS Gault, 387 U.S. at 12-27.
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child--essentially good, as they saw it-was to be made
"to feel that he is the object of the state's care and solici-
tude," not that he was under arrest or on trial. The rules of
criminal procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable.
The apparent rigidities, technicalities, and harshness which
they observed in both substantive and procedural criminal
law were therefore to be discarded. The idea of crime and
punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be
"treated" and "rehabilitated" and the procedures, from
apprehension through institutionalization, were to be
"clinical" rather than punitive.'9
The Supreme Court, in Gault, did not reject completely the
clinical and rehabilitative approach to the treatment of juveniles.
Rather, the Court found some procedures so essential to due
process that they applied to both adult and juvenile proceedings. As
stated, these procedures, fundamental to fairness, included notice,
the right to counsel, the right against self incrimination and the
right to confrontation. ° Nevertheless, the Court concluded, there
were other practices, unique to juvenile courts, which could be
continued and which were in line with the contentions of those
advocating a clinical and rehabilitative approach to juvenile
crime.2' Those practices included processing juveniles separately
from adults, not classifying juveniles as criminals, closing juvenile
proceedings to the public and making juvenile records confi-
dential.22
The trend of insuring fundamental fairness in juvenile, as well
as adult, criminal proceedings continued in the Supreme Court case
of In re Winship,23 in which the Court held that due process
required that the illegal act that a youth was charged with commit-
ting had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by a
simple preponderance of the evidence.24 In Winship, a judge of the
" Id. at 15-16 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court,
23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 119-20 (1909)).
20 Id. at 10.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 22-25.
23 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
24 Id. at 360.
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Family Court of the State of New York found that a twelve-year-
old boy had entered a locker and stolen a sum of money from a
woman's pocketbook that he found inside.25 The judge stated
specifically that the proof might not be sufficient to establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, but it was sufficient to establish guilt
by a preponderance of the evidence.26 Holding first, "that the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged," Justice William
Brennan, writing for the Court, went on to conclude that the
holding applied to juveniles at the adjudicatory stage, where a court
determines .whether the juvenile committed the crime with which
he is charged.27 As in Gault,2" the Court noted that practices
unique to juvenile courts, such as individualized treatment at the
dispositional stage of the proceedings, could be continued.2 9
When the issue ofjury trials in juvenile proceedings reached the
Supreme Court in McKeiver v Pennsylvania," the Court con-
cluded that jury trials were not essential to the fundamental fairness
of those proceedings. 31 McKeiver involved delinquency proceed-
ings in several cases arising in Pennsylvania and North Carolina.32
In all of the cases, the request for jury trials had been denied.
Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for four members of the Court,
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 364-66.
28 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
29 Winship, 397 U.S. at 364-66.
30 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
31 Id. at 554.
32 In one case, Joseph McKeiver, age 16, was charged with robbery, larceny
and receiving stolen goods, felonies under Pennsylvania law. In another case,
Edward Terry, age 15, was charged with assault and battery on a police officer
and conspiracy, all misdemeanors under Pennsylvania law. The other cases
involved approximately 45 African American children, ages 11 to 15, and arose
out of demonstrations by adults and children who were protesting a school
consolidation plan and school assignments. All except one juvenile were charged
with willfully impeding traffic. One person, James Lambert Howard, was charged
with willfully making riotous noise, being disorderly, interrupting and disturbing
school during school sessions and defacing school furniture. Id. at 534-37.
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noted that jury trials were not required in equity, workers' compen-
sation, probate, or deportation cases.33 Recognizing the fundamen-
tal fairness standard34 required by Gault5 and Winship36 in
juvenile proceedings, Justice Blackmun concluded "that trial by
jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative stage is not a constitutional
requirement. 3
7
The continued recognition of the clinical and rehabilitative
approach is illustrated by Justice Blackmun's statement that a jury
trial could make the juvenile proceeding completely adversarial. He
stated, "There is a possibility, at least, that the jury trial, if required
as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the juvenile
proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective
end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal
protective proceeding."38
Because only four justices concurred with the opinion of Justice
Blackmun in McKeiver, it was necessary to obtain another vote to
have a disposition of the Court. Justices Byron White and John
Harlan concurred in separate opinions, leading to affirmances of
both the Pennsylvania and North Carolina supreme courts. Justice
Brennan concurred in the decision with respect to the Pennsylvania
convictions, but dissented as to the North Carolina convictions.
Justice William Douglas dissented in a decision joined by Justices
Hugo Black and Thurgood Marshall. All of the opinions, with the
exception of that of Justice Harlan, addressed the clinical and reha-
bilitative approach to juveniles accused of conduct which would be
criminal if they were adults.
Noting that the "criminal law proceeds on the theory that
defendants have a will and are responsible for their actions,"39
Justice White concluded that "[a] finding of guilt establishes that
[defendants] have chosen to engage in conduct so reprehensible and
injurious to others that they must be punished to deter them and
3 Id. at 543.
34 Id.
35 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
36 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
37 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 551 (White, J., concurring).
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others from crime," '4 and that they are considered "blamewor-
thy,"' and "are branded and treated as such, however much the
State also pursues rehabilitative ends in the criminal justice
system.' ' 42 Comparing the juvenile justice system to the criminal
justice system, Justice White concluded that the conduct of
juveniles was not the consequence of a mature choice, but of
environmental pressures beyond the control of the juvenile, 43 so
that supervision and guidance rather than punishment were
required." In an almost classic statement of the theory behind the
juvenile court, Justice White stated:
Reprehensible acts by juveniles are not deemed the conse-
quence of mature and malevolent choice but of environ-
mental pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces
beyond their control. Hence the state legislative judgment
not to stigmatize the juvenile delinquent by branding him
a criminal; his conduct is not deemed so blameworthy that
punishment is required to deter him or others. Coercive
measures, where employed, are considered neither retribu-
tion nor punishment. Supervision or confinement is aimed
at rehabilitation, not at convincing the juvenile of his error
simply by imposing pains and penalties. Nor is the purpose
to make the juvenile delinquent an object lesson for others,
whatever his own merits or demerits may be.45
While noting that a jury could be a check on an overzealous
prosecutor, Justice White found protection against such activity in
the intake policies and procedures of the juvenile court system.46
Justice Brennan concluded that the jury trial was not always
essential to the fundamental fairness of a juvenile proceeding. His
differing views in the Pennsylvania and North Carolina cases were
based upon what he felt were safeguards against oppression by the
40 Id. (White, J., concurring).
I d. (White, J., concurring).
42 Id. (White, J., concurring).
43 Id. at 551-52 (White, J., concurring).
14 Id. (White, J., concurring).
" 1d. (White, J., concurring).
46 Id at 552 (White, J., concurring).
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state in one case and the absence of those safeguards in the
other.47 In Pennsylvania, juvenile proceedings could be open to
the public and public concern could serve to protect the integrity
of the proceedings.4" On the other hand, the proceedings in North
Carolina were closed to the public and, in Justice Brennan's view,
the juvenile had no protection against oppression by the state. 9
Hence, in North Carolina, he felt that juries should be required in
juvenile cases."
While noting the historical, clinical approach to the treatment
of juveniles and arguing for the retention of the best features of
that system, Justice Douglas concluded that jury trials were
required in juvenile cases and he dissented.5 The key factors for
him were the prosecution of the juvenile for a criminal act and his
or her possible incarceration until the juvenile reached twenty-one
years of age. 2
The tension between the clinical and adult approach .to the
treatment of juveniles is further illustrated in two murder cases
before the U.S. Supreme Court involving sentences of death. In one
case, Thompson v Oklahoma,53 the Court ruled by a five to three
vote that a juvenile, fifteen years of age at the time of the murder,
could not be put to death. 4 In the other case, Stanford v
Kentucky,55 the Court ruled by a five to four vote that a juvenile,
seventeen years of age at the time of the murder, could be put to
death.56
In Thompson v Oklahoma,17 four persons were tried separately
and convicted of the murder of Thompson's former brother-in-law,
47 Id. at 553-57 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
4$ Id. at 555-56 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 245 (1968) (repealed 1972)).
41 Id. at 556-57 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7a-285 (1969) (repealed 1980)).
50 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5' Id. at 558 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
487 U.S. 815 (1988).
54 Id.
" 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
56 id.
17 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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Charles Keene. All of the defendants were sentenced to death. The
motive for the killing was, at least in part, the alleged abuse of
Thompson's sister by the deceased. 8 The murder was particularly
brutal. The autopsy indicated that the deceased had been beaten,
shot twice, and cut in his throat, chest and abdomen.59
The issue before the Court was whether the sentence of death
for a defendant, fifteen years of age at the time of the murder, vio-
lated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.6" Citing a lengthy list of legislation that permitted
adults to do things that a juvenile could not,6 Justice Stevens,
writing for a four-person plurality of the Court, concluded, "All of
this legislation is consistent with the experience of mankind, as well
as the long history of our law, that the normal fifteen-year-old is
not prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an adult., 62 In
making a judgment on whether to impose the death penalty on a
fifteen-year-old, Justice Stevens answered two inquiries in the
negative: first, "whether the juvenile's culpability should be
measured by the same standard as that of an adult," and second,
"whether the application of the death penalty to this class of
offenders 'measurably contributes' to the social purposes that are
served by the death penalty. '63 In response to the first inquiry,
Justice Stevens stated, "Inexperience, less education, and less intel-
ligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of
his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more
apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an
adult."'" As for the second inquiry, Justice Stevens found that
58 Id.
'9 Id. at 819.
60 Id. at 818-19. The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
61 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 824-25 (1988) (including the right
to vote, serve on a jury, drive without consent of a parent, marry without
parental consent, purchase pornographic materials and participate in legalized
gambling without the consent of the parent); see also id. at 839-48 (appendix to
the opinion by Justice Stevens).
62 Id. at 824-25.
63 Id. at 833.
6 Id. at 835.
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applying the death penalty to a fifteen-year-old did not serve the
purpose of retribution or deterrence.65 While society might justifi-
ably exact retribution from an adult, the lesser maturity and
responsibility of a juvenile made retribution inapplicable to the
juvenile.66 In addition, given the unmatured reasoning ability and
the small number of persons under sixteen years of age put to
death, imposition of the death penalty on juveniles had little
deterrence effect. 67 Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that applying
the death penalty to a fifteen-year-old violated the Eighth
Amendment.68
It was the concurring vote of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor that
provided the necessary majority to preclude the application of the
death penalty to William Wayne Thompson. Justice O'Connor did
not, however, subscribe to the proposition that the Eighth
Amendment forbade the imposition of the death penalty on fifteen-
year-olds in all circumstances. She thus challenged the conclusion
of Justice Stevens that "[t]he road we have traveled during the past
four decades-in which thousands of juries have tried murder
cases-leads to the unambiguous conclusion that the imposition of
the death penalty on a fifteen-year-old offender is now generally
abhorrent to the conscience of the community. '69 The thrust of
Justice O'Connor's concurrence was that the evidence, that societal
standards of decency clearly opposed the death penalty for those
defendants under sixteen years of age, had not been established.7"
While she was in agreement that there might be such a national
consensus, she felt that the issue had not been resolved one way or
the other.7' Justice O'Connor concluded that, under the Oklahoma
statute in question,72 there was no minimum age at which a person
65 Id. at 836-37.
66 Id. at 816.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 815.
69 Id. at 832, 852-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
70 Id. at 848-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
72 "Child" was defined by Oklahoma statute as:
any person under eighteen (18) years of age, except for any person
sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age who is charged with
358
JUVENILE DELINQUENTS
could be put to death; it was unclear whether the Oklahoma
Legislature intended to put fifteen-year-olds to death.73 She stated:
The case before us today raises some of the same concerns
that have led us to erect barriers to the imposition of
capital punishment in other contexts. Oklahoma has
enacted a statute that authorizes capital punishment for
murder, without setting any minimum age at which the
commission of murder may lead to the imposition of that
penalty. The State has also, but quite separately, provided
that fifteen-year-old murder defendants may be treated as
adults in some circumstances. Because it proceeded in this
manner, there is a considerable risk that the Oklahoma
Legislature either did not realize that its actions would
have the effect of rendering fifteen-year-old defendants
death eligible or did not give the question the serious
consideration that would have been reflected in the explicit
choice of some minimum age for death eligibility.74
In a dissent joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Justice Byron White, Justice Antonin Scalia took issue with the
conclusion that there was a national consensus that no one under
sixteen years of age, no matter how mature, could be put to
death.7" Justice Scalia concluded that Oklahoma had carefully
considered the appropriateness of putting Thompson to death and
had concluded that it was a reasonable course. 76
In Stanford v Kentucky,77 the Supreme Court rejected the
contention that the imposition of the death penalty on sixteen or
murder, kidnapping for purposes of extortion, robbery with a danger-
ous weapon, rape in the first degree, use of a firearm or other offensive
weapon while committing a felony, arson in the first degree, burglary
with explosives, shooting with intent to kill, manslaughter in the first
degree, or nonconsensual sodomy ....
Id. at 819 n.2 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §1101(1) (Supp. 1987)). A procedure
in Oklahoma permitted the child to be treated as an adult. Id. at 819-20.
71 Id. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 859 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 863 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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seventeen-year-olds was cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.7" The majority concluded that there
was no national consensus against applying the death penalty to
juveniles.79 In addition to Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinion,
the other members of this majority included Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor and Kennedy. In his
opinion, Justice Scalia rejected the "array of socioscientific evi-
dence concerning the psychological and emotional development of
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds ' which had been presented by
those opposed to the death penalty. By contrast, Justice Brennan,
writing in dissent, expressed views similar to those that he
expressed in Thompson v Oklahoma,"' emphasizing the difference
in the development and maturity of juveniles.8 2 He was joined in
dissent by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.
II. TODAY'S TREND TOWARD HARSHER TREATMENT OF
JUVENILES
Over the past two decades, serious violent offenses by youth
under eighteen years of age have increased dramatically. 3
Juveniles are committing more serious crimes and these crimes are
being committed at younger ages.
Sixty percent of the juvenile delinquency cases processed in
1992 involved a juvenile under sixteen years of age,
compared with 57% in 1988. In 1992, juveniles younger
than age sixteen were responsible for 62% of all personal
71 Id. at 368.
71 Id. at 370-71 (noting that "[o]f the 37 states whose laws permit capital
punishment, 15 decline to impose it upon 16-year-old offenders and 12 decline
to impose it on 17-year-old offenders").
80 Id. at 377-78.
8" 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
82 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. at 394-405 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83 See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION
("OJJDP"), U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR SERIOUS,
VIOLENT AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS 1 (Dec. 1993) [hereinafter
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY].
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offense cases, 64% of all property offense cases and 39%
of drug law violation cases.
4
The FBI Violent Crime Indexs" reflects that in 1992, juveniles
were responsible for 15% of reported arrests for murder, 16% for
forcible rape, 26% for robbery and 15% for aggravated assault.16
In 1992, 12.8%, or one out of every eight arrests for violent crimes
were of juveniles.17 These figures reflect an increase from approx-
imately 58% in the number of juvenile violent crime arrests
between 1972 and 1992.88
What is perhaps most disturbing about the increase in juvenile
violent crime arrests is its contribution to the increase for certain
types of the more serious violent crimes. Between 1983 and 1992,
juveniles were responsible for 25% of the increase in murders,
forcible rapes and robberies.8 9 Between 1973 and 1987, juvenile
murder arrests averaged about three arrests per 100,000 juveniles
annually. However, by 1991, that rate had increased to 5.4 arrests
per 100,000 juveniles. The 1992 rate of 5.0 arrests per 100,000
juveniles was the first decline in seven years.90 Between 1988 and
1992 the number of juveniles arrested for murder increased by
51%, while the rate of adults arrested increased by only 9%.
14 JEFFREY BUTTS, OJJDP, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DELINQUENCY CASES
IN JUVENILE COURT 1992 (Fact Sheet No. 18, July 1994) [hereinafter FACT
SHEET NO. 18].
85 "The FBI monitors changes in the level of violent crime by tracking the
volume of four specific crimes. Combined, these four offenses--r-murder, forcible
rape, robbery and aggravated assault-form the FBI's Violent Crime Index,
which has become an accepted barometer of violent crime in the U.S." HOWARD
N. SNYDER, OJJDP, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE VIOLENT CRIME ARREST
RATES 1972-1992 (Fact Sheet No. 14, May 1994) [hereinafter FACT SHEET NO.
14].
86 HOWARD N. SNYDER, OJJDP, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE ARRESTS
1992 (Fact Sheet No. 13, May 1994) [hereinafter FACT SHEET NO. 13].
87 HOWARD N. SNYDER, OJJDP, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT CRIMES
CLEARED BY JUVENILE ARREST (Fact Sheet No. 15, May 1994) [hereinafter
FACT SHEET NO. 15].
88 FACT SHEET NO. 14, supra note 85.
89 HOWARD N. SNYDER, OJJDP, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ARE JUVENILES
DRIVING THE VIOLENT CRIME TRENDS? (Fact Sheet No. 16, May 1994)
[hereinafter FACT SHEET No. 16].
90 FACT SHEET No. 14, supra note 85.
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During this same period, juvenile arrests for forcible rape increased
by 17%, while the increase for adults was only 3%. Juvenile arrests
for robbery increased by 15%, while arrests for adults increased by
13%." Juvenile arrests for aggravated assault increased by 49%,
compared with a 23% increase for adults. Weapon law violation
arrests increased by 66% percent for juveniles, but only by 13% for
adults.9 2 In 1992, law enforcement agencies in the United States
reportedly made 2.3 million arrests of persons under eighteen years
of age.93 Significantly, 36% of these juveniles arrested were below
the age of fifteen. 94
Largely as a result of increasingly violent youth, juvenile and
family court delinquency cases have increased. In fact, "[t]he
number of delinquency cases handled by juvenile courts increased
26% between 1988 and 1992."95 In 1990, juvenile and family
courts disposed of 31% more violent cases than in 1986.96 These
cases included 64% more homicide and 48% more aggravated
assault cases.97 Nonetheless, the U.S. Department of Justice's
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention ("OJJDP")
reports that these increases in violent crime committed by juveniles
are not what has driven up the overall national increase in violent
crime during the past ten years. Rather, adult violence was
responsible for more than 80% of the overall growth in violent
9' FACT SHEET No. 14, supra note 85. "Between 1969 and 1989 juvenile
involvement in robbery declined substantially, dropping from 23% to 10%. Since
1989 the proportion of robberies cleared by juvenile arrest has increased
annually, but is still far below the levels of the late-1960s." FACT SHEET No. 15,
supra note 87.
92 Studies published in June of 1992 by the American Medical Association
reported that one-third of high school students admit to having easy access to
handguns, and that six percent say that they bring guns to school. Phillip J. Hills,
More Teenagers Being Slain by Guns, N.Y. TIMEs, June 10, 1992, at 19.
93 FACT SHEET No. 14, supra note 85.
94 "These young juveniles were involved in 11% ofjuvenile murder arrests,
38% of forcible rape, 28% of robbery, 32% of aggravated assault, 41% of
burglary,.. . 45% of runaway, 30% of weapon, and 15% of drug law violation
arrests. . . ." FACT SHEET NO. 13, supra note 86.
9' FACT SHEET No. 18, supra note 84.
96 The number of delinquency cases disposed of by juvenile courts increased
by 10% from 1986 to 1990. COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 2.
97 COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 2-3.
362
JUVENILE DELINQUENTS
crime. 98 These studies, however, reveal that the extent of juvenile
responsibility for such growth in violent crime is far greater than
it had been in the past.99
Children are also the victims of violent crimes at alarmingly
increasing rates. Teens are more than twice as likely as adults to
become the victims of violent crime.'00 Almost 4,000 children
were murdered in the United States in 1992.'01 The firearm-
related homicide rate for teens increased over 150% between 1985
and 1994.102 In 1991 alone, an estimated 5,356 children died in the
United States as a result of both intentional and unintentional
gunfire, 1 3 and it is estimated that 30 to 67 children are injured
by gunfire each day.10 4 It is also estimated that one million teens
between twelve and nineteen years of age are raped, robbed, or
assaulted each year.'0 5 Still, many other children are witnesses to
violence. Often, the perpetrators of violent crimes against children
and young adults are other youth. In 90% of the cases, these young
98 FACT SHEET No. 16, supra note 89.
9' FACT SHEET No. 16, supra note 89. In 1983, juveniles were arrested for
9.5% or 119,000 of the total 1,258,000 violent crime arrests. In 1992, juveniles
were responsible for 12.8% or 247,000 of the total 1,932,000 violent crime
arrests. FACT SHEET No. 16, supra note 89.
00 Joanne C. Lin et al., Youth Violence: Redefining the Problem, Rethinking
the Solutions, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 357, 357-58 (1994) (citing AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, COMMISSION ON VIOLENCE AND YOUTH, VIOLENCE &
YOUTH: PSYCHOLOGY'S RESPONSE 42 (1993)). In 1987, almost 1 in 17 children,
ages 12 to 17, were victims of violent crime. That ratio increased to more than
1 in 13 by 1992. However, during the same period, the rate for persons 35 years
and older showed no significant fluctuation (1 in 81 or 12.3 per 1,000 persons
in 1987, compared with 1 in 72 or 13.9 per 1,000 persons in 1992). JOSEPH
MOONE, OJJDP, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION: 1978-1992
(Fact Sheet No. 17, June 1994).
o' Lin et al., supra note 100, at 357 (citing FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES: 1992 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS tbl. 2.4 (1993)).
102 Lin et al., supra note 100, at 358 (citing Delbert Elliott, Youth Violence:
An Overview, Address at the Aspen Institute's Children and Violence Conference
(Feb. 1994)).
'03 THE CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN
YEARBOOK 64 (1994).
104 Id.
los Lin et al., supra note 100, at 357 (citing NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASS'N,
KIDS AND VIOLENCE 1 (1994)).
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perpetrators share the same ethnic background and demographic
profile as their victims.'06
Generally held public perceptions concerning the extent and
nature of juvenile crime 10 7 have resulted in a "get-tough" public
sentiment toward delinquency and a series of "get-tough"
approaches to the treatment of young offenders in recent years.
These new laws and policies have included prosecuting younger
children as adults for certain crimes, as well as imposing manda-
tory, longer and more restrictive placements of adjudicated delin-
quents and other young offenders.' 8 The National Center for
106 Lin et al., supra note 100, at 358 (citing Donna Garnett, Dimensions of
Youth Violence, in KIDS AND VIOLENCE 19 (NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASS'N ed.,
1994)).
107 Public perceptions about juvenile crime are not always supported by the
facts. The number of juvenile offenses has remained relatively static. It is the
level of violent offenses which has increased. See A National Agenda for
Children: On the Front Lines with Attorney General Janet Reno, I JUVENILE
JUST. 2 (Earl E. Appleby, Jr. et al. eds., 1993). However, this increase in violent
crime has not driven up the overall increase in crime over the past 10 years. See
FACT SHEET No. 16, supra note 89. Similarly, evidence does not support the
public's perception that there has been a significant increase in the number of
serious violent or chronic juvenile offenders. In fact, 50 to 75% of all violent
crimes committed by juveniles are committed by a mere 2 to 15% of male
juveniles. See Lin et al., supra note 100, at 358 (citing Terence Thornberry, Risk
Factors for Youth Violence, in KIDS & VIOLENCE 10 (NATIONAL GOVERNORS'
ASS'N ed., 1994); COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 1-2).
108 By 1993, 18 states had excluded serious or violent offenses from juvenile
and family court jurisdiction and 12 states.had concurrent jurisdiction with adult
criminal courts. Fifteen was the upper age for juvenile court jurisdiction in 3
states, age sixteen in 8 states, age seventeen in 39 states and the District of
Columbia, and age eighteen in Wyoming. COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra
note 83, at 29 n.2. The Federal Crime Bill, signed into law on September 13,
1994, in some respects mirrors the get-tough laws adopted in recent years by
state legislatures. PuM. L. NO. 103-322 (1994). The bill allows the federal
prosecution ofjuveniles 13 years of age and older for certain serious crimes and
for crimes involving a gun. It also authorizes the federal government to help
states develop systems to prosecute more 16- and 17-year-olds as adults for
certain violent crimes. It stiffens sentences for federal crimes committed by
juvenile gang members, and provides, generally, for a maximum one-year jail
sentence for gun possession byjuveniles. Other provisions include the imposition
of the death penalty for several dozen federal crimes, including gun murders
committed during a federal drug or violent felony and mandatory life
364
JUVENILE DELINQUENTS
Juvenile Justice estimates that in 1990, approximately 176,000
juvenile cases involving persons under eighteen years of age were
transferred from juvenile courts to adult courts for prosecution.'0 9
These cases do not include cases of juveniles filed directly in adult
courts as a result of prosecutorial discretion, or legislation giving
adult courts exclusive jurisdiction. It is estimated that in 1978, only
9,000 juveniles were prosecuted in state criminal courts as a result
of such jurisdictional, waiver, or transfer provisions. 110
Concomitantly, between 1984 and 1990, the number of juveniles
admitted to adult prisons, increased by 30%, from 9,078 to
11,782."' Between 1986 and 1990, delinquency cases processed
by juvenile and family courts increased by 10%.112 This is
equivalent to fifty cases per one thousand juveniles in the popula-
tion. 13 Similarly, between 1983 and 1993, the number of juve-
niles admitted to public and private juvenile custody facilities
increased by 19%, from 638,309 to 760,644."'
Some argue, however, that it is not the increase in crime but
public and legislative responses to it which have resulted in swell-
ing prison populations and juvenile placements." 5 While reported
overall crime increased by 8%, the nation's prison population
increased by 134% between 1980 and 1990.116 Admissions to
juvenile facilities increased by 19% in the ten years ending in 1992.
Of those juveniles detained and incarcerated in 1991, more than
one-half were being held for nonviolent offenses." 7
imprisonment for certain third-time violent felons. See Holly Idelson & David
Musci, Crime Bill Provisions, CONG. Q., Dec. 1994, at 3526, 3529-3 1.
1 9 Lin et al., supra note 100, at 366.
10 COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 29.
... COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 30.
112 COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 28.
... COVPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 28.
114 COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 29.
"' Joseph D. Lehman et al., Reducing Risks and Protecting Our Youths: A
Community Mission, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug. 1994, at 94.
116 Id.
117 Lin et al., supra note 100, at 366 (citing DALE PARENT ET AL., OJJDP,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: A STUDY TO EvALUATE
CONDITIONS IN JUVENILE DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS FACILITIES (1993)); see
also Mark Curriden, Hard Times for Bad Kids, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1995, at 66-67.
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III. INNOVATIVE METHODS FOR ADDRESSING JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY
We have moved away from the protective and rehabilitative
principles which underlay the development of juvenile and family
courts to harsher, more punitive approaches to the treatment of
young offenders. Have these get-tough approaches been effective?
Are they justified in most cases? Do stiffer sentences and confine-
ment in adult institutions have a deterrent effect on juvenile violent
behavior? Are there valid reasons for continuing to process certain,
if not all, youth in traditional juvenile or family courts?" 8
Public demand for an immediate response to youth violence has
caused much of the discussion, legislation and policy to focus on
what to do with young offenders once they have been arrested.
Those who have studied and worked in the criminal and juvenile
justice systems, however, have for some time recognized the folly
of attempting to solve delinquency by merely focusing on offenders
after their criminal behavior has taken place.1 9 The most that can
be hoped for at this point is to reduce the risk of future criminal
involvement. 120
More than rehabilitation and punishment, if appropriate, the key
to stemming the increase in juvenile crime may lie in risk-focused
prevention.12' For fifty years, criminal justice researchers and
social scientists have been studying the root causes of delinquency.
Their work has disclosed the existence of factors which tend to
increase the risk of future delinquent behavior. Among the factors
18 Michael J. Dale, The Supreme Court and the Minimization of Children's
Constitutional Rights: Implications for the Juvenile Justice System, 13 HAMLINE
J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 199 (1992); see Lin et al., supra note 100, at 366.
19 Lehman et al., supra note 115, at 94, 96.
120 Lehman et al., supra note 115, at 94, 96.
121 OJJDP, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, URBAN DELINQUENCY AND SUBSTANCE
ABUSE (July 1993) [hereinafterURBAN DELINQUENCY AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE];
see BARBARA ALLEN-HAGEN ET AL., OJJDP, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILES
AND VIOLENCE: JUVENILE OFFENDING AND VICTIMIZATION (Fact Sheet No. 19,
Nov. 1994) [hereinafter FACT SHEET No. 19]; CAROLYN SMITH ET AL.,
RESILIENT YOUTH: IDENTIFYING FACTORS THAT PREVENT HIGH-RISK YOUTH
FROM ENGAGING IN SERIOUS DELINQUENCY AND DRUG USE (1993).
366
JUVENILE DELINQUENTS
which research has identified as placing children at risk are: child
abuse and neglect, ineffective parenting and discipline, family
disruption and dysfunction, exposure to violence, conduct disorder
and hyperactivity, school failure and learning disabilities, negative
peer influences, limited employment opportunities, inadequate
housing and residence in high-crime communities. 2 ' Studies have
also disclosed that delinquency is associated with early sexual
activity, pregnancy and substance abuse.
12 3
Some of the most interesting and promising developmental
research in the field of juvenile delinquency risk assessment has
122 CoMPREHENsIvE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 23-24; JOY G. DRYFOOS,
ADOLESCENTS AT RISK: PREVALENCE AND PREVENTION 94-95 (1990); SMITH ET
AL., supra note 121, at 5-7; Lin et al., supra note 100, at 359-62; FACT SHEET
No. 19, supra note 121, at 3; URBAN DELINQUENCY AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE,
supra note 121, at 15-28; CATHY SPATZ WIDOM, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE (Oct. 1992).
"Up to 90% of juvenile delinquents and convicts report being abused as
children." Paula Craucher Thracher, Help Available to Stop Child Abuse,
ATLANTA J. & CoNST., Apr. 23, 1992, at A18. "[B]eing abused or neglected as
a child increases a person's risk of arrest as a juvenile by 53%, as an adult by
38% and for violent crime by 38%." Adult Impact of Child Abuse Greater Than
Had Been Thought, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 18, 1991, at 4A. "Abused or neglected
children grow up to have lower IQs, fewer jobs, more arrests and more drug and
alcohol abuse. . . ." Id. "As many as one in fifty U.S. children under 15 may
have a parent in jail or prison, which puts youngsters at extra risk for ...
delinquency... ." I in 50 Kids May Have a Parent in Jail, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 10,
1993, at 12. Some 70% of children in juvenile court are from single-parent
households. Cindy Loose & Pierre Thomas, 'Crisis in Violence' Becoming
Menace to Childhood, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1994, at Al. The more chronic the
criminal, the more likely it is that some of his or her relatives are also criminals.
This tends to show that delinquency is learned from one's family. Imprisonment,
Family Affair, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 2, 1992, at 24. Mothers who drink alcohol or
take drugs during pregnancy cause their babies to grow up with learning
disorders, a problem which leads to delinquency. Id. Residence in disadvantaged
neighborhoods is an important factor in fostering criminal behavior. Id. "Eighty
percent of delinquents and those with some delinquency in their records suffered
learning disabilities, and poor vision was a contributing factor in fifty percent of
those cases, the statistics showed." Delinquency and Vision Are Linked, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Feb. 5, 1984, at K6. "With classroom failure comes decreasing
motivation. They then cut the classes... and progress from... truancy to...
dropout, to brushes with the law." Id.
'23 DRYFOOs, supra note 122, at 98-104.
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focused on "protective factors," also referred to as "resiliency," in
children who are exposed to established risk factors for
delinquency. a4 Protective factors are those which decrease the
likelihood that a youngster will engage in criminal conduct,
notwithstanding the existence in his or her life of one or more
established risk factors for serious delinquency. 12 5 One such
study, the Rochester Youth Development Study, followed one
thousand Rochester public school children for four and one-half
years. The study found that over sixty percent of those adolescents
with five or more known risk factors failed to become involved in
serious delinquency or drug use and, in fact, appeared to be
resistant to such negative outcomes. The study identified a number
of protective factors in these children. Protective factors fall into
three categories: (1) family factors, that is, parental supervision and
attachment to parents; (2) educational factors, that is, reading and
mathematic ability, parental and teacher expectation and attachment
to teachers; and (3) peer factors and other resources, that is, self-
esteem, religious affiliation, mentors and social activities. The study
found that significantly higher mathematics and reading scores,
commitment to school, parental involvement and personal self-
esteem consistently distinguished resilient youth from non-resilient
youth. 12
6
It should be noted, however, that while numerous risk factors
are commonly identified by most researchers as risk factors for
delinquency, 12 researchers have not as yet been able to identify
the exact cause(s) for delinquency. 12' Nor has the identity of a
combination of causal factors, which are most crucial in explaining
delinquency, emerged from their research. 129 The difficulty in
naming the causal link to delinquency may be in the fact that the
124 See SMITH ET AL., supra note 121, at 5.
125 See SMITH ET AL., supra note 121, at 4-5.
126 See SMITH ET AL., supra note 121, at 19.
127 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
12' COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 9; EDMUND W. GORDON
& LAUREN DOHEE SONG, VARIATIONS IN THE EXPERIENCE OF RESILIENCE 27-29
(Margaret Wang & Edmund W. Gordon eds., 1994); SMITH ET AL., supra note
121, at 1.
129 SMITH ET AL., supra note 121, at 1.
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exact cause for any human behavior is never easily ascertained. The
exposure to one or more known risk factors, therefore, in no way
presumes subsequent delinquency. 3 Stuart Greenbaum has ad-
dressed the problem in this way: "Every child possesses unique
characteristics influenced by family, school, peers, and the
community that guide the child's response to a given risk factor.
... [N]o single cause accounts for all delinquency. Likewise, no
single pathway invariably leads to a life of crime."''
Nevertheless, the identification by social scientists of factors which
generally place children at risk, and of naturally occurring
protective qualities in some children which cause them to be
resilient to such risks, suggests specific areas of intervention which
should be components of any delinquency prevention or treatment
effort. 132
Several principles and themes, helpful in the design of preven-
tion and treatment programs, have emerged from risk and resiliency
research. The first is that risks occur in several spheres and
throughout a child's development. 133 Thus, delinquency preven-
tion and treatment efforts must be comprehensive, addressing a
child's family life, educational and emotional needs, as well as his
or her community environment. Apart from families, schools have
the most impact on children. When most effective, schools provide
children with, or refer children for, appropriate mental health
counseling, recreation, tutoring, vocational training and leadership
training. Schools can also provide substance abuse, pregnancy and
violence prevention programs, such as mediation, conflict resolution
training and law-related educational programs.'34
In addition, the neighborhood in which a child resides can
either place a child at risk or foster protective factors.
130 SMITH ET AL., supra note 121, at 1; Stuart Greenbaum, Drugs,
Delinquency, and Other Data, 2 JuV. JUST. 2, 2-3 (1994).
"'i Greenbaum, supra note 130, at 2-3; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note
121, at 1.
132 SMITH ET AL., supra note 121, at 2; Lehman et al., supra note 115, at 94,
96.
133 COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 5, 9; Lehman et al., supra
note 115, at 97.
'14 Lin et al., supra note 100, at 363.
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The critical feature most directly related to [youth] vio-
lence is the absence of effective social or cultural organiza-
tion in poor neighborhoods. High levels of transiency and
constant turnover in public housing [for example] make it
difficult to forge community relations. Chronic unemploy-
ment results in isolation from legitimate labor markets and
undermines the value of finishing high school.
35
Every person or institution that touches a child's life and
interacts with a child's family can contribute positively to that
child's development. Effective prevention and treatment efforts
intended to address risk factors, therefore, must be geared toward
a child's chronological development and must be implemented over
the long term.1
36
Second, children are generally most vulnerable to risk factors
that occur during their early development.1 3 ' Because "family life
occupies center stage in most theories of child development,"'
3
poor early caregiving environments, including family disruption and
discord, economic hardship, abuse and neglect and family deviance,
such as criminal involvement and alcoholic or drug addicted
parents, present especially significant risks.1 39 Research suggests
that early exposure to domestic violence or child abuse increases
the risk of violent behavior during adolescence by as much as forty
percent.140 Because the family is the first and single most impor-
tant influence in a child's life, it is also the first and most signifi-
cant line of defense against delinquency. 41 Intervention programs
should, therefore, strengthen the family and foster a child's healthy
development from prenatal care through adolescence. 4 2 These
programs should encourage the maintenance of a viable biological
or adoptive family unit and bonding between parent and child, and
provide support for families in crisis.
135 Lin et al., supra note 100, at 360.
136 Lin et al., supra note 100, at 363.
137 SMITH ET AL., supra note 121, at 2.
138 SMITH ET AL., supra note 121, at 2.
131 SuTH ET AL., supra note 121, at 2.
140 Lin et al., supra note 100, at 359 (citing WIDOM, supra note 122).
141 COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 10.
142 COMPREHENSIvE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 10.
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Family preservation or homebuilder services have been utilized
in a number of jurisdictions to preserve and strengthen families that
are at risk of having a child removed from the home due to abuse,
neglect, or a delinquency adjudication. Specially trained social
workers provide intensive in-home support and counseling. Services
provided include parenting skills training, assisting parents in
advocating for their children at school, accessing public services,
developing household management skills and improving family
dynamics.143 These efforts should involve major spheres of
influence, such as religious institutions, schools and community-
based organizations.'44
Third, the more risks to which a child is exposed, the greater
the likelihood of delinquent or other destructive behavior. A single
stressor rarely determines delinquency. All individuals are exposed
to some stress during a normal life course. 145 Rather, "it is the
additive and cumulative effects of stressors which tend to produce
more consistently negative outcomes.', 146 Evidence suggests that
risk increases exponentially with exposure to more than one risk
factor and that interventions, therefore, are likely to be more effec-
tive if they address more than one potential problem, such as
delinquency, substance abuse and violent behavior. 141
Fourth, delinquency "follow[s] a set of behavioral pathways that
progress from less serious to more serious forms of behavior.
Prevention programs [therefore] should be designed to intercept or
short circuit youth in these pathways before their behavior becomes
more ingrained."'148 Some research suggests three pathways of
problem behavior in young people which lead to serious
141 MARY LEE ALLEN ET AL., HELPING CHILDREN BY STRENGTHENING
FAMILIES: A LOOK AT FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRAMS 72-73 (1992).
144 Id.
141 FACT SHEET NO. 19, supra note 121, at 3-4; SMITH ET AL., supra note
121, at 3.
146 FACT SHEEr No. 19, supra note 121, at 3-4; SMITH ET AL., supra note
121, at 3.
141 SMITH ET AL., supra note 121, at 18; Lehman et al., supra note 115, at
97.
148 URBAN DELINQUENCY AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra note 121, at 29.
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delinquency.'49 The first pathway is authority conflict. Children
may begin, as young as three or four years of age, to engage in
stubborn behavior, followed by defiance in pre-adolescence. The
next step is authority avoidance, which might include truancy,
breaking curfews and running away. Second is the covert pathway.
It begins at about eleven years of age with minor covert acts, such
as frequent lying and shoplifting, and progresses to vandalism and
then moderate and serious delinquency. Third is the overt pathway.
It begins in pre-adolescence with bullying, and escalates to physical
altercations and violent acts." 0 It is important that those involved
in delinquency prevention recognize the characteristics of these
pathways at early stages of development when treatment is likely
to be successful.
Fifth, protective factors, which often come into play in a child's
later developmental stages, operate to buffer, counteract, or
moderate the effect of exposure to risks.'51 Moreover, cumulative
protective factors increase resilience to serious delinquency.152 "A
key strategy to counter risk factors in young people's lives is to
enhance protective factors . ... "' Research has indicated the
importance of a child's attachment to at least one parent and of
providing a child with structure, rules and expectations for achieve-
ment and for socially conforming behavior. 5 4 The ability to
succeed in school, supportive teachers and a commitment to learn-
ing have been found to operate as protective factors.' Also
important are "connections with peers and activities which are
socially rewarding and which ... foster prosocial values.,
156
Finally, intelligence and cognitive capacity, personal confidence and
self-esteem, connections with supportive non-parent adults or
149 COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 24; Greenbaum,supra note
130, at 3-4.
150 Greenbaum, supra note 130, at 3-4.
151 SMITH ET AL., supra note 121, at 7; Lehman et al., supra note 115, at 97.
152 SMITH ET AL., supra note 121, at 25.
153 FAcT SHEET No. 19, supra note 121, at 4.
154 SMITH ET AL., supra note 121, at 8.
FACT SHEET No. 19, supra note 121, at4; SMITH ET AL., supra note 121,
at 8.
156 SMITH ET AL., supra note 121, at 8.
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mentors and religion or a consistent faith perspective, have all been
associated with resilience." 7 Successful violence and delinquency
prevention programs provide children with opportunities to succeed
and to build self-esteem, foster socially appropriate behaviors and
allow children to bond with caring adults.'
Because 50 to 75% of all violent offenses by juveniles are
committed by a mere 2 to 15% of male juveniles,5 9 it is essential
that any effort to reduce youth violence and delinquency specifi-
cally target hard-core, chronic offenders. 60 To interrupt criminal
conduct and stimulate law-abiding behavior, research suggests that
a system of graduated sanctions, which combine accountability and
increasingly intensive treatment, is most effective.' 6' Graduated
sanctions should encompass a broad range of community-based and
residential alternatives, all of which must involve the juvenile's
family, coupled with intensive aftercare. 62 Rehabilitation and
treatment efforts for chronic and other young offenders must be
specifically designed to address risk factors and the protective
needs of the individual child.
163
IV THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE REHABILITATION OF
DELINQUENTS AND IN THE PREVENTION OF DELINQUENCY
Ever since the movement for the clinical and rehabilitative
treatment of juvenile delinquents began during the nineteenth
century, judges have played a crucial role. When proponents to the
juvenile court system envisaged the judicial role, they saw persons
both trained and inclined toward the view that juveniles required
the special protection of the state. The ultimate goal was to have
157 SMITH ET AL., supra note 121, at 8-9.
158 FACT SHEET NO. 19, supra note 121, at 4.
1' Lin et al., supra note 100, at 358.
60 COMPREHENsIVE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 36.
161 See JOHN J. WILSON & JAMES C. HOWELL, OJJDP, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS: A
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY (Fact Sheet No. 4, Aug. 1993).
162 Id.; COMPREHENsIVE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 36-37; FACT SHEET
NO. 19, supra note 121, at 4.
163 COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 39-41; FACT SHEET NO.
19, supra note 121, at 4; WILSON & HOWELL, supra note 161, at 4.
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juveniles grow to be productive citizens in their communities. And,
it was the judge, even though he or she required much assistance,
who was there to insure that the ultimate goal of a productive
citizen was always kept in view."
It can be argued that cases such as In re Gault'65 and In re
Winship'66 did not foreclose a different and caring approach to
the treatment of juveniles who came into contact with the criminal
justice system. Rather, the objective of those cases was to insure
fundamental fairness in the determination of the facts, which is the
prime consideration in the disposition of a case. Today, a primary
role of the juvenile and family court judge, as it relates to crime
and delinquency, is to ensure legal and constitutional rights to the
accused juvenile. Delinquency actions have evolved from informal,
almost ex parte matters, to formal adversarial proceedings in which
juveniles must be afforded specific due process rights. "As an
integral part of the decision-making process, the judge must make
certain that [children] appearing before the court receive the legal
and constitutional rights to which they are entitled.' 6
7
Today, no less than when the clinical and rehabilitative
approach was at its height and no less than when the U.S. Supreme
Court decided that fundamental fairness required notice of the
charges, the right to counsel, the right against self-incrimination,
the right to confront witnesses against him or her and proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of the allegedly criminal conduct, the judge is
at the center of what happens to youth accused of crime. The kind
of role that the judge plays and is willing to play will, in more
instances than not, has a determinative effect in the life of that
young offender.
Judges, therefore, must be creative and flexible in fashioning
dispositional orders which are tailored to address the individual
needs of the juvenile. How effective a judge is in accomplishing
this is, of course, directly related to the quality of the information
'6' See Leonard P. Edwards, The Juvenile Court and the Role of the Juvenile
Court Judge, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 1-45 (1992).
165 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
166 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
167 Edwards, supra note 164, at 25.
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before the judge. 6 ' Thus, apart from having a thorough under-
standing of the dispositional alternatives authorized by law,'69 the
juvenile and family court judge must effectively utilize diagnostic
and investigative tools. He or she must also be aware of the
treatment services and resources available, through private and
public agencies, both in placement facilities and in the community.
Today, perhaps more so than when juvenile and family courts
were created, judges do and must play crucial roles in not only the
rehabilitation of young offenders but in the effort to prevent
juvenile violence and delinquency. The structure of juvenile and
family courts and the types of proceedings over which they have
jurisdiction make judges who sit in these courts uniquely qualified,
and situated, to take an active role in preventing delinquency.
Typically, juvenile and family courts also have jurisdiction over
abused, neglected and abandoned children, and truants, runaways
and ungovernable youth.17 Some of these courts, like New York
State Family Court, handle domestic violence, paternity, support,
custody, visitation, foster care review, termination of parental rights
161 See Edwards, supra note 164, at 25.
169 The New York Family Court Act permits ajudge, following adjudication
to dismiss a delinquency petition, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 352.1, 315.2, 315.3
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1995); to grant a conditional discharge, Id. § 353.1
(McKinney 1983); to place a child on probation, Id. § 353.2 (McKinney 1983
& Supp. 1995); or to place a child away from his or her home, Id. § 353.3-.5
(McKinney Supp. 1995).
Placement is perhaps the best example of the remarkable flexibility
which has been granted to the Family Court [Judge in New York] in
framing a suitable dispositional order .... The court may choose to
place the child with a relative, with the Commissioner of Social
Services or with the Division for Youth . . . for residential care by
those agencies or for replacement with another specific agency or a
class of agencies. In addition, the duration of placement is solely a
matter of court discretion [within the prescribed maximum periods] and
may be reviewed or modified at any time.
Id. § 353.3 (Practice Commentary).
70 Juvenile and family courts exist in all 50 states and the District of
Columbia. Each of these courts differ in structure and jurisdiction. However,
most have jurisdiction over three types of cases: "(a) delinquent children, (b)
children who are 'status offenders' [runaways, truants and ungovernable] and (c)
abused, abandoned and neglected children." Edwards, supra note 164, at 5.
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and adoption proceedings as well. 7' Thus, judges who sit in
juvenile and family courts frequently have contact with children
who are at risk of becoming delinquent, or with the parents,
caretakers or siblings of these children, long before these at-risk
children enter adolescence and appear in court as respondents in
delinquency cases. Such prior contact with at-risk children and their
families provides judges and juvenile court probation services with
an opportunity to intervene and remove or ameliorate the factors
which place children at risk and to put in place those services
which might foster resiliency in these children.
While generally not viewed as a delinquency prevention
measure, evaluations and assessments of children and their home
environments routinely occur in child protective proceedings, as
well as in disputed custody and visitation matters. In these cases,
the court is required to focus upon the needs and "best interests" of
the child.172 Judges, also, are more likely to view truants and
children who engage in other "status offenses,"' 73 as at risk of
becoming delinquent in light of the plethora of evidence, both
anecdotal and empirical, indicating that truancy and ungovernability
are precursors to delinquency.'74 In fact, New York law mandates
that alleged status offenders and their guardians be diverted from
the family court to social services agencies,175 where they are
provided with individual and family counseling, remedial education,
medical, psychiatric and other appropriate services.
171 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 115 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
172 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 1017(b), 1022(iii), 1028(b), 1030(c),
1052(b)(i)(A), 1082(4) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1995); Eschbach v. Eschbach,
56 N.Y.2d 167, 170, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1262, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 660 (1982);
Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 94, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767, 477
N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1982).
"' "Status offenders are children who have committed an offense which
would not be [a] crime if committed by an adult. Status offenses include truancy,
running away from home, curfew violations, being beyond the control of parents,
using tobacco and alcohol, and unruly behavior." Edwards, supra note 164, at 10;
see also N.Y. FAM CT. ACT § 732 (McKinney 1983).
174 DRYFOOS, supra note 122, at 98-104; Curriden, supra note 117, at 69;
Delinquency and Vision Are Linked, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1984, at K6; Lin et al.,
supra note 100, at 359.
175 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 734-735 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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Juvenile and family court judges, as well as all judges who
handle cases in which children are involved, have an opportunity
to become actively involved in the delinquency prevention effort.
Such opportunities exist even when the child is neither a party to
nor the subject of the proceeding. For instance, in cases involving
spousal abuse, the court's immediate response is to protect the
family from the abuser by, for example, excluding him or her from
the home and, at disposition, to direct, inter alia, that the batterer
receive rehabilitative services. However, because children who
witness domestic violence are clearly at risk of becoming violent
and delinquent, 7 6 it is essential that these children are not only
protected from domestic violence, but are provided with counseling
and appropriate services.
The modem juvenile and family court judge has many other
roles to play, all of which are designed to assist the juvenile to
achieve his or her full potential.'77 The National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges, in its publication, Children and
Families First.: A Mandate for America Courts,7 ' describes the
modem juvenile or family court judge as having a number of
characteristics and roles. These include: (1) willingly advocating for
the needs of children and families; (2) being educated in and
having an understanding of family dynamics and child develop-
ment; (3) being committed to principles of treatment, rehabilitation
and family preservation, as well as having a regard for community
protection and accountability; (4) assuming leadership in improving
the administration of justice for children and families, by, inter alia,
taking an active role in the development of policies, laws, rules and
standards by which these courts and their allied agencies and
176 Adult Impact of Child Abuse Greater Than Had Been Thought, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 18, 1991, at 4A; Katherine Boo, The Tower Girls at D.C. Home,
Delinquent Teens Struggle to Recover the Futures They Left Behind, WASH.
POST, Feb. 12, 1995, at Al; Help Available to Stop Child Abuse, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Apr. 23, 1992, at A18; Lin et al., supra note 100, at 359; Edgar C.
Walker & Lisa Fischel Wolovick, Children Who Witness Violence, N.Y.L.J., Oct.
17, 1994, at 1.
177 Edwards, supra note 164, at 25.
17' NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES,
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES FIRST: A MANDATE FOR AMERICA'S COURTS.
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systems function; and (5) exercising the authority which exists to
order, enforce and review the delivery of specific services and
treatments for children and families. 79
CONCLUSION
The role of the judge in proceedings involving juveniles
accused of criminal behavior has changed drastically over the
decades. In part, this is because no one has yet come up with an
ideal solution for dealing with juvenile delinquency or how to
prevent it. The reforms brought about by cases such as In re
Gault 18 were necessary to protect the constitutional and legal
rights of juveniles accused of crimes. As important as these rights
are, the judge who deals with criminal behavior by juveniles has a
unique role to play by using his or her authority and influence to
turn those potentially or actually delinquent children into productive
citizens of our society.
179 Id. at 3-4.
"'o 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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